

Chela Sandoval

Revolutionary Force:

Connecting Desire to Reality

Our language evolves from a culture that abhors anything tending to obscure or delete the fact of the human being who is here and now/the truth of the person who is speaking or listening. Consequently, there is no passive voice construction possible... every sentence insists on the living and active participation of at least two human beings, the speaker and the listener.

June Jordan

It may well be that on the plane of "life," there is but a totality where structures and forms cannot be separated. But science has no use for the ineffable: It must speak about "life" if it wants to transform it.

Roland Barthes

The only way we can [fight oppression] is by creating another whole structure that touches every aspect of our existence, at the same time as we are resisting.

Audre Lorde

In our *mestizaje* theories we create new categories for those of us left out or pushed out of the existing ones. We recover and examine non-western aesthetics while critiquing western aesthetics; recover and examine non-rational modes and blanked out realities while critiquing rational consensual reality; recover and examine indigenous languages while critiquing the languages of the dominant cultures.

Gloria Anzaldúa

I feel as if I'm gonna keel over any minute and die. That is often what it feels like if you're really doing coalition work. Most of the time you feel threatened to the core and if you don't, you're not really doing no coalescing.

Bernice Johnson Reagon

New Citizen-Subjects: Michel Foucault

Many twentieth-century prophets predicted a revolutionary form of human who rises from the ruins of previous social orders: from Fanon and Césaire to Bhabha and Said; from Haraway and de Lauretis to Anzaldúa and Lorde, the list goes on.¹ The vision of this new being in the passage that follows emerges from the 1966 mind of Michel Foucault. The psychic landscape Foucault describes in the following passage images the cultural terminations and beginnings that typify postmodernism globalization, the end of "Western man," the homogenization of difference, and some other, utopian, decolonizing zone as well:

And yet the impression of fulfillment and of end... something we glimpse only as a thin line of light low on the horizon—that feeling and that impression are perhaps not ill founded.... It will be said that Hölderlin, Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx all felt this certainty that in them a thought and perhaps a culture were coming to a close, and that... another was approaching—in the dim light of dawn, in the brilliance of noon, or in the dissension of the falling day. But this close, this perilous imminence whose promise we fear today, whose danger we welcome, is probably not of the same order.... In our day... it is not so much the absence or the death of God that is affirmed as the end of man... man has "come to an end," and that by reaching the summit of all possible speech, he arrives not at the very heart of himself but at the brink of that which limits him... new gods, the same gods, are already swelling the future Ocean; man will disappear.²

Ten years later (and one year before his death) Foucault challenged historians, philosophers, and critical and cultural scholars alike by asserting that the "most certain" of all contemporary philosophical problems is "the problem of the present time—of what we are, in this very moment."³ His suggestion for how the citizen-subject should behave in relation to globalizing cultural dynamics was clear: in order to allow for the emergence of a liberatory "something else," Foucault predicted nothing less than the self-deconstitution of (Western) man.⁴ The target of our attention under postmodern cultural conditions, he claimed, is "not to discover what we are, but to *refuse* what we are." At the same time, we must learn how to "promote new forms of subjectivity," he advises. But the generation of new kinds of citizen-subjects can happen only when we become capable of refusing "the kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries."⁵ To self-reflexively refuse one's own sense of "individuality," of identity, is not an easy task—but this is the content of the emancipatory work that Foucault believed was necessary.

Such questions of identity have hovered on the academic horizon for decades and determined much scholarly writing in journals and books. Little of this discussion, however, has been accomplished for the sake of bringing about the kind of self-reflexive psychic transformations for which Foucault is agitating.⁶ Like Foucault, for example, Fredric Jameson also senses the presence of new subjectivities coalescing under the pressures of postmodern globalizing conditions. Jameson cringes at this new emergence, however, which for him represents another horrifying effect of a world gone mad, a world that produces schizophrenic citizen-subjects who take in every new experience with the exhilaration of difference, but who are not capable of discerning the differences that matter in terms of organizing a more egalitarian and just human order. Jameson's despair is that there is no way to make effective interventions, no way to rechart subjectivity in an advanced capitalist cultural machine that desires our interventions to feed its machinations. Jameson's position is that there are no strategic interventions to be made, only horror to be felt in the recognition of a living cultural pathology—schizophrenic in nature—which we must all partake of eventually, or remain in the netherworld of detachment, unable to feel a part of social life at all. For Jameson, neocolonial postmodernism seduces through a form of insanity appropriate to the twenty-first century that is being generalized to a point of normality. But Foucault at the end of his life is less interested in the desires of the cultural order; his interests are in the desires of the citizen-subject: this shift in focus and interest makes all the difference.

Periodizing Resistance

Resistance is the unspecified term that lies outside the binary configuration of domination and subordination—yet form of resistance is only effective insofar as it is specifically related to the forms of domination and subordination that are currently in place. Foucault and Jameson agree that a new, global decolonizing collective project of resistance can be best advanced through understanding the configurations of power that operated in the historical periods just prior to our own time. According to Jameson, the most important manifestations of power occurred under the two previous moments of capitalism: small-market capitalism and monopoly (or imperialist) capitalism.⁷ Jameson considers the transnational, postmodern stage of capitalism we now inhabit as the contemporary and third stage of capitalist development.⁸ Crucial to understanding the desperation that drives Jameson's theoretical apparatus is the understanding that the first two stages have culminated in the current sci-fi moment of postmodernism wherein the "underside of culture is death," violence, and horror,⁹ and the possibility of resistance lies only as faint hope on the rising "dystopian horizon" of transnational capitalism.¹⁰ For Foucault, alternately, resistance is possible and already present, even if its existence circulates in heretofore unrecognizable forms.

Like Jameson, Michel Foucault situates our present moment in history by outlining its differences from two historical stages that preceded it. But Foucault wants to compare contemporary cultural conditions (which he leaves unnamed) to two more broadly defined previous modes of social organization that matter—feudalism and capitalism. Each of these historical periods expresses its own predominant modes of domination, subordination, and resistance. Today, he believes, citizen-subjects who are interested in generating effective modes of resistance capable of confronting neocolonial postmodernism must first recognize the fact that much of our perceptual apparatuses and tactics for action are based on past, outmoded yet residual conceptions of power and resistance.

The two most previous modes for organizing Western social order—feudalism and capitalism—each generated very different approaches for understanding and resisting power. Under feudalism, for instance, Foucault writes that struggles "against forms of ethnic (religious) or social domination were prevalent."¹¹ Under capitalism, however, a shift occurs so that "the Marxist struggle against exploitation (e.g., that which separates individuals from what they produce) came into the foreground."¹² In the twentieth century, and primarily in industrialized first world nations, a third form of social organization and its concomitant forms of dom-

inations and subordinations has emerged so that, in Foucault's view, a third form of resistance has necessarily developed. This new predominant mode of resistance occurs, writes Foucault, in the form of a political "struggle against the forms of subjection—against the submission of subjectivity—against that which ties the individual to himself and submits him to others in this way."¹³ Foucault wants us to recognize the revolutionary and unique character of this third mode of resistance.

Every social order structured around domination and subordination releases power relations that crush citizen-subjects into positionalities, escape from which only certain kinds of resistances prove effective.¹⁴ But whether a social order is predominantly feudal, market-capitalist, monopoly-capitalist, or postmodern in function, theorists across disciplinary divides can agree generally that the first world during the late twentieth century experienced a great social, economic, and political divide—a mutation that has transfigured the kinds of powers, dominations, subordinations, and resistances that can be constituted. For Jameson, this mutation resulted in a "cultural pathology" that produces in the citizen-subject a hysterical exhilaration akin to schizophrenia, out of which effective forms of oppositional consciousness are unlikely to rise. Foucault, however, perceives this great new cultural and social mutation that is postmodernism as helping to saturate all citizen-subjects with forms of oppositional consciousness that are capable of confronting the most psychically intrusive forms of domination and subordination yet devised. Both thinkers understand that the forces released by this third-stage transmutation of cultural economics are saturating the psyche of the individual citizen-subject in a new kind of power.

Refusing Fascism with Foucault

This new kind of power, Foucault warns, "applies itself to immediate everyday life, categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him."¹⁵ This is how postmodern powers turn individuals into subjects—citizen-subjects. There are two meanings of the word SUBJECT, Foucault continues, "subject to someone else" by control and dependence, or being "tied" to one's own identity through "conscience or self-knowledge." Both meanings suggest a form of power that "subjugates and makes subject to." But, unlike Jameson (or Althusser, for that matter), Foucault does not recognize this form of power to be fundamentally *dehumanizing*—*deindividualizing*. Rather, this immersion of the state's apparatus into every aspect of the individual citizen-subject's life and

into the very structuring of the psyche has allowed, Foucault thinks, the development of a new kind of resistant and "oppositional" individual who could never have been produced under earlier forms of Western social organization.

Before the citizen-subject's birth into the social world, the intersections of race, culture, sex, gender, class, and social powers are already locating in order to provide a particular space to hold that individual, to pattern the kind of subjectivity it will be permitted. From the moment of its birth, the citizen-subject becomes regulated, branded, and shaped, the first world ideological apparatus imbricated through its subjectivity in a novel and, we might say, more total way than ever before. First world citizen-subjects take pride in their "freedom" of movement and speech, their activities trusted—as "good citizens"—to replicate the social order and its hierarchizations, usually without the necessary imposition of directly brutal state force. From the vantage point of Foucault's analysis, the first world citizen-subject who is wholly incorporated in the (post)modern state might well envy the largely unincorporated subjective spaces that still survive around certain populations living under more feudal or earlier capitalist forms of domination, who, in spite of the subordinations under which they live, are still "free" from the overwhelming determinations that influence the subjective spaces of neocolonized postmodern first world citizen-subjects. The problematics of postmodern transnational globalization are of a special nature in relation to consciousness and the status of first world citizen-subjects, Foucault thinks. That is why he advises such citizen-subjects to recognize that the "political, ethical, social, and philosophical problem of our day is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state's institutions, but to liberate us... from the type of individualization which is linked to the state."

This nature of this "liberation" must be of a different order than that struggled for under previous modes of social organization. It will require, Foucault insists, that we "promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of the kind of individuality which has been imposed on us."¹⁶ Citizen-subjects have become so surrounded and "trapped" in our own histories of domination, fear, pain, hatred, and hierarchy that the strategic adversary under postmodern times has become our own sense of self.¹⁷ Unlike "enemies" under feudal or capitalist eras, the major enemy to face during our own time has infiltrated every citizen-subject's body. What we must face, writes Foucault, is that the structure of this internalized form of everyday being is fascist. And there is "fascism in us all," he continues, "in our heads and in our everyday behavior." It is this internalized fascism that "causes us to love power," so that we now "desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us." Foucault challenges all citizen-subjects of every social class who live under neo-colonial post-

modernism to answer the following questions: "How does one keep from being fascist, even (especially) when one believes oneself to be a revolutionary militant? How do we rid our speech and our acts, our hearts and our pleasures, of fascism? How do we ferret out the fascism that is ingrained in our behavior?"¹⁸

Principles of Politically Revolutionary Love and Desire:

Anti-Postmodernism, Deindividualization

These questions can be answered through understanding and applying the principles below, which, in Foucault's view generate access to politically revolutionary love, desire, and resistance. Taken together, these principles represent a new model for political action in resistance that is effective under postmodern cultural conditions: their enactment creates an oppositional and differential form of consciousness. The kinds of affinities and coalition building that these principles promote undo fascism by grounding identity differently than ever before. Foucault was concerned to point out that the forces of transnational capitalism inspired this "developing movement toward political struggle" which "no longer conforms" to any previous struggle for emancipation in history—Marxist or otherwise (xii). This social and identity movement is generating a new form of oppositional consciousness that inspires in its practitioners what Foucault describes as an unprecedented "experience and a technology of desire" (ibid.). Even though today, he continues, "old banners" of political resistance and identity are still "raised," ideological combat has already "shifted and spread" into "new zones" that can undo fascism—new zones of oppositional consciousness (ibid.). The principles below of political desire, love, and resistance should "motivate us to go further," Foucault hopes, in developing this new, "anti-postmodern," antifascist, and anticolonial oppositional consciousness and praxis (xiii). These principles puncture through the contingencies of everyday life, and provide access to that other reality with so many names and technologies, the differential place of consciousness.

This new social movement is infused with what Foucault calls a "desire" capable of driving the body and the will beyond their limits. Desire permeates being of all kinds, he writes, being-in-resistance as well as being in-domination. Indeed, it is desire, Foucault thinks, that drives, focuses, and permeates all human activity. What is required, then, is to reinforce an experience and technology of *desire-in-resistance* that can permit oppositional actors to move—as Audre Lorde puts it—"erotically" through power.¹⁹ Foucault adds this ingredient to the hermeneutic of love we are constructing by asking, and answering, the following question: "How can and must desire deploy its forces within the political domain, and grow more intense in the process of overturning the established order? *Ars erotica, ars theoretica*,

ars politica" (xii). He provides the following schema to permit this unprecedented politics of desire, a schema focused and driven by concrete principles that can "guide" oppositional agents in "the art" of countering "all forms" of fascism: "the fascism in our behavior, the fascism in our hearts" (xiii). These principles are Foucault's contribution to a uniquely politicized (and "differential") form of social and psychic opposition to authoritarian postmodern global powers. They cut right to the chase, and are "less concerned with *why* this or that than with *how*" to proceed (xii):

- Free political action from all unitary and totalizing paranoia.
- Develop action, thought, and desires by proliferation, juxtaposition, and disjunction, and not by subdivision and pyramidal hierarchization.
- Withdraw allegiance from the old categories of the Negative (law, limit, castration, lack, lacuna), which Western thought has so long held sacred as a form of power and an access to reality. Prefer what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flow over unities, mobile arrangements over systems. Believe that what is productive is not sedentary but nomadic.
- Do not think that one has to be sad in order to be militant, even though the thing one is fighting is abominable. It is the connection of desire to reality (and not its retreat into the forms of representation) that possesses revolutionary force.
- Do not use thought to ground a political practice in Truth; nor political action to discredit, as mere speculation, a line of thought. Use political practice as an intensifier of thought, and analysis as a multiplier of the forms and domains for the intervention of political action.
- Do not demand of politics that it restore the "rights" of the individual, as philosophy has defined them. The individual is the product of power. What is needed is to "deindividualize" by means of multiplication and displacement, diverse combinations. The group must not be the organic bond uniting hierarchized individuals but a constant generator of *deindividualization*.
- Do not become enamored of power. (xiii; my emphasis)

Oppositional Cyber-Consciousness, Feminists of Color, and Revolutionary Politics: Donna Haraway

This book ends in its own chiasmus by examining the connections of feminist theory to U.S. third world feminism, theories of globalization, de- and postcoloniality, and all of these are related to the methodology of the oppressed. This chapter studies these theoretical sites as they influence the work by a contemporary philosopher of science. Donna Haraway's "Manifesto for Cyborgs" is one of the most highly circulated essays written in the late twentieth century on the relations between science, technology, and revolutionary feminist politics. The manifesto might best be described its own terms—it is a "theorized and fabricated hybrid," a textual "machine," and a "fiction" that maps and locates "our social and bodily reality." But make no mistake, these are also the terms that Haraway uses in order to describe and ensure the development of a revolutionary form of human being, a creature who lives in both "social reality" and "fiction," and who performs and speaks in a "middle voice" that is forged in the amalgam of technology and biology—a cyborg-poet.²⁰

This vision standing at the center of Haraway's imaginary is a "monstrous" image; for this new creature is the "illegitimate" child of human and machine, science and technology, dominant society and oppositional social movement, male and female, "first" and "third" worlds—indeed, of every binary. It is a being whose hybridity challenges all binary oppositions and every desire for wholeness, she claims, in the very way "blasphemy" challenges the body of religion (149). Haraway's blasphemy is a twenty-first-century being that reproaches, challenges, transforms, and shocks. But perhaps the greatest shock in this feminist theory of cyborg politics has taken place in the corridors of women's studies, where Haraway's model has acted as a transcoding device, a technology that has translated the fundamental precepts of differential U.S. third world feminist criticism into categories comprehensible under the jurisdictions of feminist, cultural, and critical theory.

Haraway has been very clear about the intellectual lineages and alliances of the propositions she named "cyborg theory." As she writes in her introduction to *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women* (1991), one primary aim of her work is equivalent to a central aim of U.S. third world feminist criticism, which is the "breakup of versions of Euro-American feminist humanism in their devastating assumptions of master narratives deeply indebted to racism and colonialism."²¹ Her second aim is to propose a new technopolitics and form of being. Cyborg feminism will be "more able" than racist feminisms of earlier times, she writes, to "remain attuned to specific historical and political positionings and permanent partialities without abandoning

the search for potent connections."²² Through these aims, the structures of cyborg feminism become one with those of differential U.S. third world feminism.

Indeed, Haraway's cyborg feminism was conceived as a way to join the efforts of U.S. feminists of color in challenging what Haraway herself has identified as hegemonic feminism's "unreflective participation in the logics, languages, and practices of white humanism," insofar as white feminism tended to search "for a single ground of domination" by which to "secure our revolutionary voice" as women (160). The feminist theory produced since 1968 "by women of color," Haraway asserts, has developed "alternative discourses of womanhood," and these discourses have disrupted "the humanisms of many Western discursive traditions."²³ Haraway's statements demonstrate her strong political alliances with feminists of color, so it makes sense that Haraway should turn to differential U.S. third world feminism for help in modeling a revolutionary form of human body and consciousness capable of challenging "the networks" and "informatics" of postmodern social realities.

As she lays the foundations for her theory of science, technology, and oppositional politics in the postmodern world, Haraway thus recognizes and reckons with differential U.S. third world feminist criticism in ways that other scholars have been unable to. Remaining clear on the issue of cyborg feminist theory's intellectual lineages and alliances, Haraway writes:

White women, including socialist feminists, discovered (that is, were forced kicking and screaming to notice) the non-innocence of the category "woman." That consciousness changes the geography of all previous categories; it denatures them as heat denatures a fragile protein. Cyborg feminists have to argue that "we" do not want any more natural matrix of unity, and that no construction is whole. (157)²⁴

But to recognize that "no construction is whole" is not enough to stop internalized and externalized forms of authoritarianism—of fascism. Much of Haraway's work thus has been to identify the technical *skills* required for producing a dissident global movement and human being that are capable of generating egalitarian and just social relations. The skills she identifies are equivalent to the technologies I have identified in this book as the methodology of the oppressed.

Radical Mestizaje

It is no accident of metaphor that Haraway's theoretical formulations are woven through with terminologies and techniques from U.S. third world cultural forms, from Native American categories of "trickster" and "coyote" being (199), to *mestizaje*,

through to the category of "women of color" itself, until the body of the oppositional cyborg becomes wholly articulated with the material and psychic positionings of differential U.S. third world feminism.²⁵ Like the "mestiza consciousness" described and defined under U.S. third world feminism, which, as Anzaldúa explains, arises "on borders and in margins" where feminists of color keep "intact shifting and multiple identities" with "integrity" and "love," the cyborg of Haraway's manifesto is also "resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy and perversity" (151). In this equivalent alignment, Haraway's feminist cyborgs can be recognized (like agents of U.S. third world feminism) as the "illegitimate offspring" of militaristic "patriarchal capitalism" (ibid.). So too are feminist cyborg weapons and the weapons of U.S. third world feminism similar: "transgressed boundaries, potent fusions and dangerous possibilities" (154). Indeed, Haraway's cyborg textual machine generates a methodology that runs parallel to that of differential U.S. third world feminist criticism. Thus, insofar as Haraway's work became influential in feminist studies, her oppositional cyborgology helped to bring hegemonic feminist theory into alignment with theories of indigenous resistance, *mestizaje* understood as a critical apparatus, the differential form of U.S. third world feminism, and the methodology of the oppressed.²⁶

The alignment between U.S. hegemonic feminism and U.S. third world feminism clicks into place at the point when Haraway provides a doubled vision of a "cyborg world," as seen in the passage below. The "cyborg" world of neo-colonial postmodernism, she believes, can be understood either as the culmination of a Euro-American "white," masculinist society in its drive for mastery, on the one side, or, on the other, as the material manifestation of such resistant "indigenous" worldviews as *mestizaje*, U.S. third world feminism, or cyborg feminism.²⁷ Haraway writes:

A cyborg world is about the final imposition of a grid of control on the planet, about the final abstraction embodied in Star Wars apocalypse waged in the name of defense, about the final appropriation of women's bodies in a masculinist orgy of war. *From another perspective* a cyborg world might be about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their *joint kinship* with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints. (154; my emphasis)

The important notion of "joint kinship" here is analogous to that called for in contemporary indigenous writings in which tribes or lineages are identified out of those who share, not bloodlines, but rather lines of affinity. Such lines of affinity occur through attraction, combination, and relation carved out of and in spite of

difference. They are what comprise the mode of radical *mestizaje* called for in the works of U.S. scholars of color, as in the following 1982 example. Here Alice Walker asks U.S. black liberationists to recognize themselves as mestizos:

We are the African *and* the trader. We are the Indian *and* the Settler. We are oppressor *and* oppressed . . . we are the *mestizos* of North America. We are black, yes, but we are "white," too, and we are red. To attempt to function as only one, when you are really two or three, leads, I believe, to psychic illness: "white" people have shown us the madness of that.²⁸

The kind of radical *mestizaje* referred to in this passage and elsewhere can be understood as a complex kind of love in the postmodern world, where love is understood as affinity—alliance and affection across lines of difference that intersect both in and out of the body. Walker understands "psychic illness" as the attempt to be "one"—like the singularity of Barthes's narrative love that controls all meanings through the medium of the couple in love. The function of *mestizaje* in Walker's vision is more like that of Barthes's "prophetic love," where subjectivity becomes freed from ideology as it ties and binds reality. Prophetic love undoes the "one" that gathers the narrative, the couple, the race, into a singularity. Instead, prophetic love gathers up the *mezcla*, the mixture that lives through *differential movement* between possibilities of being. This is the kind of "love" that motivates U.S. third world feminist *mestizaje* understood as the differential theory and method of oppositional consciousness, what Anzaldúa has theorized as *la conciencia de la mestiza*, or the consciousness of the "Borderlands."²⁹

Haraway weaves these U.S. third world feminist commitments to affinity through difference into her model for an oppositional cyborg feminism. In so doing, she provides yet another mapping of the differential theory and method of oppositional consciousness that is comprised of the technologies of the methodology of the oppressed.³⁰ In Haraway's version, oppositional cyborgism does not view differences and their corresponding "pictures of the world" relativistically (190), that is, as "allegories of infinite mobility and interchangeability."³¹ Such anarchistic mobility is not enough. Instead, Haraway believes, differences should be seen as instances of the "elaborate specificity" and the "loving care people might take to learn how to see faithfully from another point of view" (*ibid.*). Haraway's example is provided in the differential writings by U.S. feminists of color whose hope and vision is not grounded on their own belief in some "original innocence (or the imagination of a once-upon-a-time wholeness" or oneness). The power of their writings, she continues, is derived from their insistence on the possibilities of affinity through

difference—of differential consciousness enacted as a method of racial *mestizaje*—which allows for the guided use of any tool at one's disposal in order to ensure survival and to remake the world. Put differently, translates Haraway, the task of an oppositional cyborg feminism should be to "recode" all tools of "communication and intelligence" with one's aim being the subversion of "command and control" (175). Haraway's analysis of the written work by Chicana activist/intellectual Cherríe Moraga's provides her a primary example.

Women of Color

The passage below reflects the way in which Haraway understands the identities of "women of color" to operate in the same manner as her theory and politics of oppositional cyborgism. It is in this conflation between women of color as identity, and cyborg feminism as theory, that a peculiar elision occurs, as we shall see. Haraway rightly describes Cherríe Moraga's language as one that is not "whole":

it is self-consciously *spliced*, a chimera of English and Spanish, both conqueror's languages. But it is this *chimeric monster*, without claim to an original language before violation, that crafts the erotic, competent, potent identities of women of color. Sister Outsider hints at the possibility of world survival not because of her innocence, but because of her ability to live on the boundaries, to write without the founding myth of original wholeness, with its inescapable apocalypse of final return to a deathly oneness.... Stripped of identity, the bastard race teaches about the power of the margins and the importance of a mother like *Malinche*. Women of color have transformed her from the evil mother of masculinist fear into the originally literate mother who teaches survival. (175-76)

Unfortunately, differential U.S. third world feminist criticism (which is a set of theoretical and methodological strategies) is often misrecognized and underanalyzed by readers when it is translated as a demographic constituency only (women of color), and not as a theoretical and methodological approach in its own right.³² The textual problem that becomes a philosophical problem and, indeed, a political problem, is the conflation of U.S. third world feminist criticism—understood as a theory and method of oppositional consciousness—with the demographic or "descriptive" and generalized category of "women of color," thus depoliticizing and repressing the specificity of the politics and form of consciousness developed by "U.S. women of color," or "feminists of color," and erasing the specificity of what is a *particular* form of these: "differential U.S. third world feminism."

Haraway recognizes these problematics, however, and how by gathering up the category "women of color" and identifying it as a "cyborg identity, a potent subjectivity synthesized from fusions of outsider identities" (i.e., "Sister Outsider"), her work inadvertently contributes to the elision of differential U.S. third world feminism by turning its approaches, methods, forms, and skills into examples of cyborg feminism (174). In 1991 she thus amended her position, by saying that today "I would be much more careful about describing who counts as a 'we' in the statement 'we are all cyborgs.'" Indeed, she suggests that the centrality of cyborg theory might be replaced with something else capable of bridging the apartheid of theoretical domains. Why not find a name or concept that can signify "a family of displaced figures, of which the cyborg" is only one, she suggests, and then "ask how the cyborg" can make connections with other nonoriginal people who are also "multiply displaced."³³ Let us imagine a new "family of figures," she continues, who can "populate our imaginations" of "postcolonial, postmodern worlds that will not be quite as imperializing in terms of a single figuration of identity."³⁴

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, such aims remain unresolved across the terrain of oppositional discourse, or rather, they remain *multiply answered and divided by academic terrain*. Even within feminist theory, Haraway's cyborg feminism and her later development of the technology of "situated knowledges" (though they come close), cannot bridge the gaps that create the apartheid of theoretical domains identified earlier. So Haraway tries another approach in her argument from a chapter in the Butler and Scott anthology *Feminists Theorize the Political*. Her essay begins by stating that those women who were "subjected to the conquest of the new world faced a broader social field of reproductive unfreedom, in which their children did not inherit the status of human in the founding hegemonic discourses of U.S. society."³⁵ This is the reason that "feminist theory produced by women of color" in the United States generates "discourses that confute or confound traditional Western standpoints." If dominant feminist theory is to incorporate differential U.S. third world feminist theory and criticism, she asserts, then the focus of feminist theory and politics must shift to that of making "*a place for the different social subject*."³⁶ This shift could bring women's studies into affinity with theoretical terrains such as postcolonial discourse theory, U.S. third world feminism, postmodernism, global studies, and queer theory, she thinks, and would thus begin to bridge the apartheid of theoretical domains. Here, Haraway's work introduces the cross-disciplinary method I have identified in this book as the methodology of the oppressed.

How can such a shift in feminist theory be accomplished? Haraway proposes this: that feminists become "less interested in joining the ranks of gendered femaleness," to instead become focused on "gaining the *INSURGENT* ground as female social subject" (95).³⁷ This means that the focus of "women's studies" must be relocated to examining how power moves through, between, and *outside* the binary divide male/female. Haraway's challenge is that only in this way will feminist theories concerned with sexed and "gendered racial subjectivities" be able to take "affirmative *and* critical account of emergent, differentiating, self-representing, contradictory social subjectivities, with their claims on action, knowledge, and belief."³⁸ What we are talking about is the development of a new form of "antiracist"—indeed, even antigender—feminism where there will be "no place for women," Haraway asserts, only "geometrics of difference and contradiction crucial to women's cyborg identities" (171). How does one enact this new kind of "feminism"—or oppositional consciousness?

The Science, Technics, and Erotics of the Methodology of the Oppressed

A new feminist oppositional consciousness, Haraway thinks, will require the development of "technologies" that can disalienate and realign the human joint that connects our "technics" (material and technical details, rules, machines, and methods) with our "erotics" (the sensuous apprehension and expression of love as affinity).³⁹ This new joining can only occur through the methodology of the oppressed, what she calls a "politics of articulation,"⁴⁰ which is capable of creating "more powerful collectives in dangerously unpromising times."⁴¹ Haraway's politics of articulation is comprised of "skilled practices," she writes, that are honed and developed within oppressed, or subordinated, classes. Haraway's position is that all peoples who now live under postmodern cultural conditions must learn to act from what she (along with Foucault) calls these "standpoints of the subjugated." Subjugated standpoints are described as being

savvy to [dominant] modes of denial through repression, forgetting, and disappearing acts—ways of being nowhere while claiming to see comprehensively. The subjugated have a decent chance to be on to this god-trick and all its dazzling—and therefore, blinding—illuminations. "Subjugated" standpoints are preferred because they seem to promise more adequate, sustained, objective, transforming accounts of the world. *But HOW to see from below is a problem requiring at least as much skill with bodies and language, with the mediations of vision, as the "highest" techno-scientific visualizations.* (191; my emphasis)

The key to finding a dissident form of globalization is to develop technologies to "see from below," and, as Haraway points out, learning to do so requires "as much skill" with bodies, language, and vision as learning the most sophisticated forms of "technoscientific" visualization. Haraway's answer is to provide readers her own version of the technologies of the methodology of the oppressed, which, in her view, are the very skills necessary to "see from below." It is these skills that permit the constant, differential repositioning necessary for perception from "subjugated standpoints." Haraway's work develops its own vocabulary for identifying the five technologies of the methodology of the oppressed ("semiotics," "deconstruction," "meta-ideologizing," "democratics," and "differential movement"). In her view, these technologies together comprise the politics of articulation that are necessary for forging an unprecedented mode of feminist methodology.

Haraway describes the first skill of the subjugated/oppressed when she writes that "self-knowledge requires a semiotic-material technology." This initial technology, she states, links "meanings and bodies" in order to open "non-isomorphic subjects, agents, and territories to stories" that are "unimaginable from the vantage point of the cycloplan, self-satiated eye of the master subject" (192). The second and third technologies of concern here, deconstruction and meta-ideologizing, are interventionary vectors that are primary means, asserts Haraway, for "understanding and intervening in the patterns of objectification in the world." In the effort to transform this objectification, "decoding and transcoding plus translation and criticism: all are necessary." The fourth technology, democratics, is that which guides the others. The moral force of this technology is indicated in Haraway's assertion that in all oppositional activity "*we must be accountable*" for the "patterns of objectification in the world" that have become the real. To rise to the level of this accountability, the practitioner of cyborg feminism cannot be "about fixed locations in a reified body." Rather, the practitioner must deploy a fifth and final technology, to move differentially in, with, and about "nodes in fields" and "inflections in orientations." Through such differential mobilities the practitioner engages her and his own ethical approach and "responsibility for difference in material-semiotic fields of meaning," she writes (195). Haraway's cyborg feminism recognizes that all innocent "identity" politics and epistemologies are impossible as strategies for seeing from the standpoints of the subjugated. Thus, in relation to differential consciousness itself, Haraway's cyborg feminism is "committed" in the enactment of all its skills to "mobile positioning," "passionate detachment," and the "kinship" generated by affinity through difference (192). These six locations are the "cyborg skills" that Haraway believes are necessary for developing a feminism for the twenty-first century. They represent

another transcoding of the differential consciousness and the five "subjugated stand-points" that are the technologies I have identified in this book as the methodology of the oppressed.

Whether figured in the terms of cyborg feminism, as Foucault's principles for political desire, as Barthes's punctum to political being, as White's power of the middle voice, as Anzaldúa's *mestizaje*, or as the methodology of the oppressed, these skills, born of de-colonial processes, similarly insist on new kinds of human and social exchange that have the power to forge a dissident transnational coalitional consciousness, or what Haraway calls an "earthwide network of connections." These skills enable a coalitional consciousness that permits its practitioner to "translate knowledges among very different—and power-differentiated—communities" (187). They thus comprise the grounds for a different kind of "objectivity"—of science itself—Haraway continues.

New Sciences: Objectivity and Differential Consciousness

Haraway's science for the twenty-first century is one of "interpretation, translation, stuttering, and the partly understood." It is being welded by an oppositional practitioner she calls the "multiple subject with at least double vision." From the viewpoint of this unprecedented science, objectivity becomes transformed into a process Haraway calls "situated knowledges" (188). When scholars transform their consciousness of objectivity into a consciousness of situated knowledges, they develop a different kind of relation to perception, objectivity, understanding, and production that is akin to White's and Derrida's descriptions of the middle voice; for this consciousness demands the practitioner's "situatedness," writes Haraway, "in an ungraspable middle space" (111).⁴² Like the mechanism of the middle voice of the verb, Haraway's situated knowledges require that what is an "object of knowledge" also be "pictured as an actor and agent" (198), transformative of itself and its own situation while also being acted upon. Haraway's development of the concept of situated knowledges demands the ability of consciousness to perceive, move, and perform according to a process that is becoming more easily identifiable and nameable: this is the differential form of oppositional consciousness that, through political and technical necessity, depends on the methodology of the oppressed.

Thus it is no accident that the third chapter of Haraway's book *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women* is named "differential politics for inappropriate/d others." Her chapter defines a coalescing and ever more articulated form of decolonizing global social movement from where, as Haraway puts it, "feminist embodiment" re-

sists "fixation" in order to better ride the "webs of differential positioning" (196). Haraway's thesis is this: theorists who subscribe to this decolonizing postmodern mode of oppositional consciousness must learn to be "more generous and more suspicious—both generous *and* suspicious, exactly the receptive posture" we must all seek in "political semiosis generally." This strategy for identity and social construction is "closely aligned with the oppositional and differential consciousness"⁴³ of U.S. third world feminism, she writes, that is, with the *theory and method of oppositional consciousness in its differential form* that is outlined in *Methodology of the Oppressed*. The differential politics of 1980s U.S. third world feminism thus was not only a cultural politics. It also represented a technoscience politics sufficient for the next phase of resistance.⁴⁴

Technoscience Politics: The Methodology of the Oppressed Creates a Decolonizing Cyberspace

The oppositional and differential politics outlined in this book occur in a realm I first defined in the preceding chapters on the methodology of the oppressed as a "cyberspace." Haraway provides the definition for a neocolonizing postmodern version of cyberspace as follows:

Cyberspace seems to be the consensual hallucination of too much complexity, too much articulation. It is the virtual reality of paranoia. Paranoia is the belief in the unrelieved density of connection, requiring, if one is to survive, withdrawal and defense unto death. The defended self re-emerges at the heart of relationality. Paradoxically, paranoia is the condition of the impossibility of remaining articulate. In virtual space, the virtue of articulation, the power to produce connection threatens to overwhelm and finally engulf all possibility of effective action to change the world.⁴⁵

This is a harsh, unrelenting, and ruthless cyberspace of infinite dispersion and interfacing. But how does cyberspace alternately come to be understood as the generous and compassionate zone of the zero degree of meaning, prophetic love, or of the form of differential consciousness that is accessed by the methodology of the oppressed?

It has been assumed that the oppressed will behave without recourse to any *particular* method, or rather, that their behavior consists of whatever acts one must commit in order to survive, whether physically or psychically. This is exactly why the methodology of the oppressed can now be recognized as the mode of being best suited to life under neocolonizing postmodern and highly technologized conditions in the first world; for to enter a world where any activity is possible in

order to ensure survival is to enter a cyberspace of being. In the past this space was accessible only to those forced into its terrain. As in Haraway's definition above, this cyberspace can be a place of boundless and merciless destruction—for it is a zone where meanings are only cursorily attached and thus capable of reattaching to others depending on the situation to be confronted. Yet this very activity also provides cyberspace its decolonizing powers, making it a zone of limitless possibility, as in the examples of the "gentle abyss" in Barthes's formulation, the realm of *différance*, the processes of the "middle voice," or in Fanon's "open door of every consciousness," and Anzaldúa's "*coatlicue* state." Its processes are closely linked with those of differential consciousness.

This benevolent version of cyberspace is analogous to the harsh cyberspace of computer and even social life under conditions of globalization in Haraway's pessimistic vision. Through the viewpoint of differential oppositional consciousness, the technologies developed by subjugated populations to negotiate this realm of shifting meanings can be recognized as the very technologies necessary to all first world citizens who are interested in renegotiating postmodern first world cultures, with what we might call a sense of their own power and integrity intact. But power, integrity—and morality—as Anzaldúa suggests,⁴⁶ will be based on entirely different terms than those identified in the past when, as Jameson writes, individuals could glean a sense of self in opposition to a centralizing dominant power that oppressed them, and then determine how to act. Under global postmodern disobediences the self blurs around the edges, shifts in order to ensure survival, transforms according to the requisites of power, all the while (under the guiding force of the methodology of the oppressed as articulated by Fanon and the rest) carrying with it the integrity of a self-conscious awareness of the transformations desired, and above all, a sense of the impending ethical and political impact that such transformations will perform.

Haraway's theory of cyborg feminism, her recognition of "subjugated standpoints," her articulation of the skills that comprise these standpoints, and her theory of objectivity as "situated knowledges" constitute a politically articulate and this time feminist version (and another affirmation of the presence across disciplines) of what I refer to as the differential form of social movement and consciousness. When she writes that cyborg feminism is about "nodes in fields, inflections in orientations, a responsibility for difference in material-semiotic fields of meaning" (195), her cyborg feminism calls up the same nexus of affinity, the same technologies of resistance, the same "love" in the postmodern world called up not only by contemporary theorists

who have written their way out of dominant first world status, including Barthes, Fanon, Derrida, Foucault, Hayden White, and many others, but also by those who insisted on an internally dissident country within their own nation-state, U.S. "third world" feminists⁴⁷ such as (to name only a few) Paula Gunn Allen, Nellie Wong, Audre Lorde, Gloria Anzaldúa, Trinh Minh-ha, Joy Harjo, and Janice Gould.

Haraway's theory challenges and weds first world postmodern politics on a transnational world scale with the decolonizing apparatus for global survival I call the methodology of the oppressed. It is in these couplings (where "race, gender, and capital require a cyborg theory of wholes and parts" [181]) that Haraway's work contributes to bridging the gaps between disciplines that create the apartheid of theoretical domains, outlined in chapter 3. What is being suggested here is that the coding necessary to remap the "disassembled and reassembled" postmodern "collective and personal self" (163) must occur according to a guide that is capable of aligning feminist theory with other locations for thought and politics that are aimed at egalitarian social change. This alignment can happen when being and action, knowledge and science, are self-consciously encoded through what Haraway calls subjugated and situated knowledges, and what I call the methodology of the oppressed. This methodology is arising globally from varying locations, through a multiplicity of terminologies and forms,⁴⁸ and indomitably from the minds, bodies and spirits of U.S. feminists of color who demanded the recognition of *la conciencia de la mestiza*, womanism, indigenous resistance, and identification with the colonized. Only when feminist theory self-consciously recognizes and applies this methodology can feminist politics become fully synonymous with antiracism; only when global theory, cultural theory, critical theory, and ethnic theory recognize this methodology can they become synchronous with feminism and each other.

By the twentieth century's end, oppositional activists and thinkers had invented new names, indeed, new languages, for what is the purview of the methodology of the oppressed and the *coatlicue*, differential consciousness it demands. Some of these terminologies and technologies, from "signifyin'" to *la facultad*, from U.S. third world feminism to cyborg feminism, from Foucault's principles for political desire to the apparatus of the middle voice, from situated knowledges to strategic feminism, from the abyss to *différance*, have been variously identified. The methodology of the oppressed provides a schema for the cognitive map of power-laden social reality under global postmodern conditions for which oppositional actors and theorists across disciplines, from Fanon to Jameson, from Barthes to Anzaldúa, from Lorde to Haraway, are longing.

Conclusion: Differential Manifesto, **Trans-Languages, and Global** **Oppositional Politics**

DIFFERENTIAL SOCIAL movement and the forms of praxis it produces are not simply part and parcel of the cultural superstructure of our age, deeply connected as they are to the methodology developed by the oppressed under previous social formations, and which is now reemerging as useful to all citizen-subjects who must learn to negotiate, survive, and transform present social conditions into better worlds come to life. The self-conscious operation of differential social movement represents the opportunity to engage in social praxis through the constant surveying of social powers and interjection in them by a new kind of repoliticized citizen-warrior. Differential oppositional social movement and consciousness represent constructivist functions that perceive power as their world space, and identity as the monadic unit of power via subjectivity capable of negotiating and transforming power's configurations. Through the deployment of a differential mode of oppositional consciousness, practitioners can self-consciously replace themselves within the circle of moral conceptions defining our current social horizons, for its activity undoes the conscience—the incarnation of the law—thus renewing consciousness itself.

The differential mode of oppositional social movement and consciousness can thus be understood as a *symptom* of transnational capitalism in its neo-colonizing postmodern form (insofar as interest in this mode of resistance is arising out of pressures peculiar to this newest form of globalization), as well as a *remedy*

for neocolonizing postmodernism both in spite and because of its similarities in structure to power's postmodern configurations. Yet what must be remembered is that the differential resides in the place where meaning escapes any final anchor point, slipping away to surprise or snuggle inside power's mobile contours—it is part and parcel of the undefinable meaning that constantly escapes every analysis.

As we saw in chapter 3, where differential consciousness arises in that space between and through meaning systems I call a "cyberspace," and in chapter 5, which examines some of the "unimaginable solutions and unforeseeable syntheses" predicted by Barthes that lead to a *coatlicue* state, to what is theorized as "love" in the postmodern world in chapters 6 and 7, differential consciousness permits the poetic movement of consciousness both "backwards" through the Sr/Sd/Sign relationship and "forward" to create new levels of metaideology: it represents a cruising, migrant, improvisational mode of subjectivity. This subjectivity is prodded into existence through an outsider's sensibilities: a lack of loyalty to dominant ideological signification, combined with the intellectual curiosity that demands an explosion of meaning (in semiotic and deconstructing activities), or to meaning's convergence and solidification (in meta-ideologizing), for the sake either of survival or of political change toward equality. The politicized differential mode of oppositional consciousness expressed here can be represented as a form of awareness that touches human reality as encoded in ideology on every side: it provides the condition or medium through which difference both arises and is undone; it joins together through *movement*, both in the processes of the perception and semiotic decoding of meaning and in the deployment of units-of-reality in the production of meta-ideologizing; and it provides a social, cultural, political, and psychic means for engaging with reality. In this last sense, differential oppositional consciousness is contingent upon the ways in which reality—as constructed through historical agencies—presents itself as "natural" while being laden with the values, hopes, and desires of the dominant social order.

That is why the differential is subjunctive; it is that which joins together the possible with what is, the place where indirect style or discourse occurs until it finds purposeful, guided, political reason to be through the reconfiguration of units-of-power in the interests of their egalitarian distribution. This form of political subjectivity resides in a state of contingency, of possibility, readying for any event. Dependent on the chances provided by power, the differential mode of oppositional consciousness movement is conditional: subject to the terms of dominant power, yet capable of challenging and changing those very same terms. It is a mode of consciousness and activity that is not necessarily true or false—only possible, active,

and present. It promotes social movement with purpose, both subject to the terms of power and capable of transforming them. This social movement generates a different kind of negotiation as it barter meaning systems, using skills accomplished by a new kind of collectivity that attaches strings, makes demands, imposes conditions, negotiates terms.

Differential social movement finds its expression through the methodology of the oppressed. The technologies of semiotic reading, deconstruction of signs, meta-ideologizing, differential movement, and moral commitment to equality are its vectors, its expressions of influence. These vectors meet in the differential mode of consciousness, which carries them through to the level of the "real" where they can impress and guide dominant powers. So too differential oppositional consciousness is itself a force that rhizomatically and parasitically inhabits each of these vectors, linking them in movement, while the pull of each vector creates the ongoing tension and re-formation of the liberal, revolutionary, supremacist, or separatist ideological forces that inscribe social reality. The differential can be thus thought of as a constant reapportionment of space, of boundaries, of horizontal and vertical realignments of oppositional powers. Because each vector occurs at different velocities, one of them can realign all the others, creating different kinds of patterns, and permitting entry at different points. These energies revolve around each other, aligning and realigning in a field of force that materializes a hermeneutics of love in the postmodern world that can generate an oppositional cosmopolitics. Each technology of the methodology of the oppressed creates new conjunctural possibilities, produced by ongoing and transforming regimes of exclusion and inclusion. Differential consciousness is thus a crossing network of consciousness, a trans-consciousness that occurs in a register permitting the networks themselves (as we saw in the example of U.S. third world feminism) to be appropriated as ideological weaponry.

This theory and method of oppositional consciousness is a committed and achievable field for mobile and transformable subjectivity; a consciousness (formally demanded only of the oppressed) developed and represented within women-of-color feminism, where it was understood and utilized as an expression of the methodology of the oppressed. Here, differential oppositional consciousness was encoded as *la facultad* (a semiotic vector), the "outsider/within" (a deconstructive vector), "strategic essentialism," (a meta-ideologizing vector), *la conciencia de la mestiza*, "world traveling" or "loving cross-cultures" (differential vectors), and "womanism" (a democratizing, moral vector).¹ Unlike Westerners such as Patrick Moynihan who have argued that "the collapse of (Soviet) Communism" in 1991 proves that "racial, ethnic, and national ties of difference only ultimately divide any society,"² the differ-

ential technologies of oppositional consciousness, as utilized and theorized by a racially diverse U.S. coalition of women of color, demonstrate the procedures for achieving affinity and alliance across difference; they represent the modes that love takes in the postmodern world.³ The differential permits the generation of a new kind of coalitional consciousness and warrior-citizenship: countrywomen and countrymen of the same psychic terrain. Differential consciousness, the technologies of the methodology of the oppressed, and oppositional differential social movement and its ideological weaponry are part and parcel of a global decolonizing alliance of difference in its drive toward egalitarian social relations and economic well-being for all citizenry: an oppositional global politics, a cosmopolitics for *planeta tierra*.

Postmodern neocolonialism is mitigated by the differential form of oppositional social movement, which etches and transforms it with varying resistant *movidas*. The differential form of social movement is guided by the methodology of the oppressed, which is a set of technologies that grasp meaning—transforming and moving it on both sides, that of social reality, and that of the realm of the “abyss.” The methodology of the oppressed acts as a punctum, a courier that accesses the realm of consciousness that is differential. *This* differential consciousness is a practice for identity, a political site for the third meaning, that obtuse shimmering of signification that glances through every binary opposition. Taken together, these processes and procedures comprise a hermeneutic for defining and enacting love in the postmodern world, and a method for generating oppositional global politics.

But the differential is not easily self-consciously wielded, inhabited, named, or achieved, as many of our great contemporary thinkers so aptly explain. “Most of the time you feel threatened to the core,” states Bernice Johnson Reagon.⁴ Louis Althusser puts it this way: because “class instinct is subjective and spontaneous,” the class instinct of the middle classes and “*thus of intellectuals*” must undergo a painful and “revolutionary” transformation in order to become oppositional—that is, in order to become aligned with the methodology of the oppressed.⁵

In chapter 2 I schematized the politics of the oppressed into four principal practices, which I argued are the four prevalent rhetorical figures generated within U.S. leftist politics during the late twentieth century. I typified these figures as the equal-rights, revolutionary, supremacist, and separatist forms of oppositional political activity. Each political tactic is generated in order to challenge the dominant ideological/economic/social forms that define and castigate particular social types as inferior. I argued that these four forms of oppositional politics should be understood as differing ideologies, each requiring its own particular subjective life from practitioners, and each delimiting the forms of collectivity-in-opposition that it permits.

As in the example of the U.S. women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s, we saw that these ideologies can congeal and solidify within any liberation movement until each comes to represent itself as *the* most effective and moral mode of oppositional behavior and consciousness. This dynamic is the basis on which each of these political practices-become-ideology earned the charge against it of "racism," "sexism," "elitism," or "essentialism."

Barthes warns that when ideologies gather up inside a revolutionary movement (that collective will committed to cathartic acts meant to "reveal the political load of the world"—and then to *make* the world), when oppositional tactics become strategies, metalanguages, ideologies, then what Barthes calls an "ex-nomination" of the revolutionary impulse takes place. Ex-nomination, or un naming, Barthes explains, is what happens when revolutionary political practice "distorts itself into a 'Nature'" in order to take better control, to be more easily understood, exchanged, and deployed. This form of meta-ideologizing, Barthes warns, if not exercised self-consciously and tactically, will "sooner or later be experienced as a process counter to revolution," as in the way "Stalin" as meta-ideology became the dominant ideology during the 1930s Soviet Union. This revolutionary form of frozen meta-ideologizing, the unhinging of consciousness from its political commitment to the differential mode, permits any oppositional practice to become only another version of dominant ideology, another version of supremacism. This is why the oppressed have only one true mode of revolutionary activity, the ability to perceive and decode dominant-order sign systems in order to move among them with a certain literacy, thus ensuring their survival, and one true mode of revolutionary consciousness, which is the ability of consciousness to differentially move through the being of meaning, and *toward* a possible and utopian world of desire, social and psychic life, *amor en Aztlán*, differential consciousness.

Indeed, my argument is that it is the ability to conceive of the equal-rights, revolutionary, supremacist, and separatist ideologies as *constructed* by the oppressed in liberatory action, to understand them as forms of consciousness that are themselves readable, inhabitable, interpretable, and transformable when necessary, and to recognize their structural relations to one another through an overgirding theory and method of oppositional consciousness, that comprises the fifth and differentially acting form of consciousness and activity in opposition. The differential form of oppositional consciousness is both another mode of these oppositional ideologies and at the same time a transcendence of them. Functioning on an altogether different register, differential oppositional consciousness is what makes it possible to identify the previous modes as the politics of the Other-in-opposition,

what permits the practitioner to perceive their structural relatedness, and thus to tactically utilize or move among them. In Barthes's terms, it is a differential form of consciousness that permits the oppositional social actor to use ideology itself as "the departure point" for another semiological chain,⁶ a resignification process whose ultimate outcome is then viewed as only another *tactic*—not a strategy—capable of shifting dominant ideological systems. This is a transitive, revolutionary activity born out of a differential political practice, a strategy comprised fully of tactics. It is a self-conscious and transitive movement of mind, of middle-voice reflexivity that is required for this kind of operation, if one is to fully understand and utilize semiology as a practice for the emancipation of the imagination. This manipulation of one's own consciousness through ideological forms and meanings requires the desire and ability to move differentially through one layer of Sr/Sd/Sign relationship and into another artificial or self-consciously manufactured ideological system, according to one's reading of power as it settles inside of ideology—that humanly constructed artifice of meaning itself.

With the transnationalization of capitalism, when elected officials are no longer leaders of singular nation-states but nexuses for multinational interests, it also becomes possible for citizen-subjects to become activists for a new decolonizing global terrain, a psychic terrain that can unite them with similarly positioned citizens-subjects within and across national borders into new, post-Western-empire alliances. Barthes, in spite of his commitments to the metamorphosis of dominant cultures and forms of consciousness, banished himself from this imagined community. But the new countrypeople who fight for egalitarian social relations under neo-colonial postmodernism welcome citizenry to a new polity, a new homeland. The means for entry is "the methodology of the oppressed," a set of technologies for decolonizing the social imagination. These technologies—semiotic perception, the deconstruction of supremacy, the meta-ideologizing of signification, the differential perception and deployment of consciousness, are all processes that are guided by democracies, the practitioners' commitment to the equal distribution of power. All these technologies together, when also joined to those of differential social movement and to those of differential consciousness, operate as a single apparatus that I call the physics of love. Love as social movement is enacted by revolutionary, mobile, and global coalitions of citizen-activists who are allied through the apparatus of emancipation.

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